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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOYLE MAX WILSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS, Case No. 17596 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section 
35
-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial review of a decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which denied Plaintiff unemployment 
compensation for a period of six weeks. 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
A Department Representative denied unemployment benefits to Plaintiff/ Appellant 
(hereinafter referred to as "claimant"), and claimant appealed. After due notice and hearing, an 
Appeal Referee for the Industrial Commission affirmed the Department's denial of benefits by 
decision dated December 30, 1980. The decision of the Appeal Referee was affirmed by the 
Board of Review by decision in Case No. 80-A-4579, 81-BR-19, dated February 24, 1981, and 
issued February 27, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board of Review and the Appeal Referee. 
Defendant seeks affirmance of such decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Claimant's Statement of Facts is very brief, leaves out facts pertinent to the issue before the 
court, and is substantially composed of argument. Therefore, Defendant offers the following 
summary of the facts: 
Prior to filing for unemployment insurance benefits effective October 19, 1980, claimant 
had been employed as a layout man for Eaton Metal Products from January23, 1978, (R. 0029) 
or 1979, (R.0017, 0012) to October 17, 1980. (R.0029) The claimant converted to the Christian 
Church and subsequently quit his job in Salt Lake City to move to Indiana for the purpose of 
seeking religious fellowship with members of his own church. (R. 0012, 0018) 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THAT IN REVIEWING A DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
2 
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The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established. Section 
35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953; Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 Ut. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 
(1978). This court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission are 
supported by evidence, they will not be disturbed. Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. 
Industrial Commission, 104 Ut. 242, 139 P. 2d 208. A reversal of an order of the Department 
denying compensation can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the 
determination and the facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the 
Department's denial is clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Kennecott Copper 
Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 Ut. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 
(1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 Ut. 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44 (1966). 
POINT II 
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT IS TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO 
ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTS BUT SUCH RULE DOES NOT PERMIT AN EXTEN-
SION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO ONE WHOSE INITIAL UNEMPLOY-
MENT MAY BE VOLITIONAL. 
Section 35-4-5(a) provides: 
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes establishing a 
waiting period: 
(a) for the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good 
cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter until the 
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and 
earned wages for such services equal to at least six times the claimant's 
weekly benefit amount; provided that no claimant shall be ineligible for 
benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a nature 
that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
The commission shall in cooperation with the employer consider for the 
purposes of this act, the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the 
extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to 
the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a 
claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
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It is a generally acknowledged rule that Employment Security statutes are construed 
liberally to accomplish their purposes and objectives. However, in Utah and elsewhere the 
courts construe such statutes in a manner which distinguishes those petitioning as benefi. 
ciaries of the Act who become unemployed for reasons attributable to themselves. This court 
has previously pointed out that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist the 
worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his part. Kennecott 
Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, supra. The court has 
also noted that the underlying legislative intent of the various disqualifying provisions of the 
Act is that the Department is to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensa-
tion by adhering to the volitional test, and declared the policy of the contributions provisions of 
the statute to be to establish financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed through 
no fault of their own. Olaf Nelson Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 121 Ut. 
521, 243, P. 2d 951 (1952). 
This court has recently held that: 
The initial determination of "good cause" for voluntarily leaving 
employment is a mixed question of law and fact for the adminis-
trative agency. A claimant has the burden of showing good cause 
for leaving when he voluntarily terminates suitable employment. 
"Good cause" has been defined as "such cause as would similarly 
affect persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity, and is limited 
to those instances where the unemployment is caused by external 
pressures so compelling that a reasonable prudent person, exer-
cising ordinary common sense and prudence, would be justified in 
quitting under similar circumstances." Denby v. Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah) 567 P. 2d 630 (1977). 
(Citations omitted.) 
There is no dispute that claimant left his work with Eaton Metal Products voluntarily. (A. 
0010, 0028) Claimant contends that he had good cause for voluntarily leaving work in order to 
exercise his right to freedom of religion without harassment or hardship because of his beliefs. 
(Plaintiff's Brief, page 2.) The Appeal Referee, as affirmed by the Board of Review, found that 
the claimant left work to move to Indiana which is the seat of the claimant's religious belief, to 
seek religious fellowship with members of his own church. (R. 0012) The Appeal Referee further 
4 
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found that the job conditions under which the claimant worked were not so adverse as to 
compel immediate separation before the claimant had found other work. (R. 0013) The factual 
issue thus presented is whether the evidence supports the finding of the Appeal Referee that 
claimant's quit was to seek religious fellowship elsewhere or, as claimant contends, because of 
harassment. The applicable standards to determine "good cause" are standards of reasonable-
ness, and the question of good cause is to be determined from the circumstances of each 
individual case. Stevenson v. Morgan, 17 Or. App. 428, 522 P. 2d 1204, 1206 (1974); Wilton v. 
Employment Division, 26 Or. App. 549, 553 P. 2d 1071 (1976). That claimant's reasons for 
leaving his employment under the particular circumstances of his case do not fall within the 
standards of "good cause" as set forth in the Denby case, supra, is evident from the record, as 
will be shown in Point Ill herein. The issue of law presented by this case is whether the First 
Amendment Right of Freedom of Religion extends the benefits of the unemployment insurance 
program to a claimant who quits work to seek religious fellowship in another community. In this 
regard it should be noted that "good cause" for leaving work has been interpreted by the 
Industrial Commission to include a good faith leaving on religious grounds. General Rules of 
Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving, Section 90. However, good faith leaving on religious grounds 
does not include a// religious reasons for leaving work, no matter how remotely related to the 
work such reasons may be, but rather to those instances where conflict arises between the 
claimant's work and religious beliefs. This matter is more fully discussed in Point Ill hereof. 
POINT Ill 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE APPEAL REFEREE THAT 
CLAIMANT VOLUNTARIL y LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE IS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION. 
The claimant apparently contends on appeal to the court that he quit his job with Eaton 
Metal Products due to harassment because of his religious beliefs. (See appeal to Board of 
Review, R. 0010; and Appellant's Brief, Statement of the Nature of the Case, page 1.) The 
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Appeal Referee, as affirmed by the Board of Review, specifically found, however, that 
claimant left work" ... to move to Indiana to seek religious fellowship with members of his own 
church." (R. 0012) This finding is amply supported by the record. 
The claimant filed his claim for unemployment benefits in October 21, 1980, (R. 0029) at 
which time he also completed a Statement On Voluntary Quit (R. 0028). Two responses to the 
questions therein illuminate the claimant's mental attitude at the time he quit: 
"What was the main reason you left work? Moving because of family and religon 
[sic] conflicts with parts of family." 
"Explain why you felt it was necessary for you to quit. List all facts that you feel are 
important. Moving to Ind. because religon [sic] conflicts between certain parts of 
the family. Job was slow so I felt it was a good time to move. Had planded [sic] to move 
for some time." (R. 0028) 
These statements were later supported by the claimant's testimony before the Appeal 
Referee: 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Why was it that you left your employment? 
When I grew up I was raised in a family in the L.D.S. religion. 
L.D.S. is Latter Day Saints or what? 
Latter Day Saints. It was only natural that I would follow that religion up 
until I decided to search on my own for my beliefs and whatnot. I got 
married and my wife became L.D.S., but we didn't feel right with that so 
later on we became Christians, following under a man by the name of 
William (inaudible)--
--William Brannam? 
There just wasn't anybody that believed in what we believed around so it 
caused a lot of family conflicts and as far as working goes I just didn't feel 
right working around the people that I had been working around due to 
religious beliefs. 
You mean the people on the job had a different belief? 
Well, there wasn't a lot of conflict. It was just language and that kind of 
stuff. 
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Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
You mean they used curse words or what? 
Yes. 
Did you make a complaint to the employer regarding the use of language? 
No. I didn't want to bring religion up as the reason I quit. I didn't want to 
use religion--
How many followers does he have? 
He's got--well, there's followers all over but the major part of its right here 
in Jeffersonville, Indiana. Jeffersonville, Indiana, is where he called his 
headquarters and he is deceased now. There are tapes and books and 
everything on him and 1--me and my wife just didn't feel comfortable 
without people we could fellowship with and stuff so we decided to move 
and the best place we figured we could move is where people believed the 
same way we believe. 
How do his teachings differ from others? Say a Methodist or a Baptist or a 
Catholic? 
Christians live (inaudible) and you want to live like Christ did, I guess you 
have to try to be (inaudible) and I wasn't ever raised that way so its been a 
struggle for me and I just had to be around people who believe the way I 
did and who didn't look down on me for the way I believe. His teachings 
are 100% by the Bible and I guess everybody has prophets and I believe he 
was a true prophet and so he's the man I want to follow and look toward. 
There just--my parents being L.D.S. there was a conflict and I just had to 
move away so I came here because here is--my wife has a couple of 
relatives here and they follow William Brannam and we needed some 
fellowship. Since we've been here we've got it and things are going really 
smooth. Its just being around people who believe the way you believe so 
you don't have all the headaches and you don't have people making fun of 
you. 
Did your co-workers make fun of you? 
No. They were always having beer parties and every once in a while they 
had beer at work. I use to be involved in it and when I started following this 
Christianity it changed my life and then people would look at me for what I 
was and not for what I became. There was just--not so much the guys I 
worked with, they were good guys and everything, it was how I felt inside 
myself. (R. 0017, 0018) 
Such statements are clear and convincing evidence that the claimant left work to seek 
religious fellowship in Indiana. Although the claimant cannot be faulted for desiring to live 
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among those who believe the same as he, such desire does not constitute "good cause" within 
the meaning and intent of Section 5(a) of the Employment Security Act, and denial of benefits 
does not infringe on claimant's right to the free exercise of his religion. 
One alleging infringement of the First Amendment free exercise clause has the burden"to 
show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his 
religion." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 222, 223, S. Ct. 1560 (1962). Thus, in 
the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963), the claimant 
had been discharged by her employer for refusing to work on Saturday, which is the Sabbath 
Day of her faith. The claimant had become a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in 
1957, when her employer did not require Saturday work. In 1959 the employer found ii 
necessary to require work on Saturdays. The United States Supreme Court held that the lower 
court ruling which upheld a denial of benefits forced the claimant to choose between giving up 
her right to unemployment benefits or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order 
to accept work. In the more recent case of Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Emp/oymenl 
Security Division, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981 ), the claimant had worked in his employer's roll foundry 
which fabricated sheet steel for a variety of uses, but when the foundry was closed he was 
transferred to a department that fabricated turrets for military tanks. All other departments to 
which transfer might have been sought were engaged directly in the production of weapons, so 
claimant asked to be laid off. When his request was denied, the claimant quit because his 
religious belief precluded him from aiding in the production of items used in warfare. The Court 
reversed the denial of benefits, saying through Mr. Chief Justice Burger: 
Here, as in Sherbert, the employee was put to a choice between 
fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work; the coercive impact 
on Thomas is indistinguishable from Sherbert, where the Court 
held: 
(N]ot only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligi-
bility for benefits derives soley from the practices of her 
religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that 
practice is unmistakable [citation omitted]. Id. at 1432. 
8 
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The Chief Justice further explained the principle of law involved in cases such as this as 
follows: 
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon 
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a 
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby 
putting substantial pressure on the adherent to modify his behav-
ior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. Id. 
The other cases cited by claimant are in accord with Sherbert and Thomas. 
In the instant case a denial of benefits hampers claimant's personal desire to have fellowship 
with others of his faith. but does not in any manner coerce the claimant to engage in conduct 
proscribed by his religion or to deny benefits because the claimant engages in conduct 
required by his religion. In other words, the claimant's employment had no impact on the 
exercise of his religious beliefs, as evidenced by the claimant's testimony: 
Referee 
Mr. Wilson 
Did your co-workers make fun of you? Did your employer make fun 
of you? 
No. They were always having beer parties and every once in a while they 
had beer at work. I used to be involved in it and when I started following 
this Christianity it changed my life and then people would look at me for 
what I was and not for what I became. There was just--not so much the 
guys I worked with, they were good guys and everything, it was just how I 
felt inside myself. (R. 0018 Emphasis added.) 
It is very likely that the claimant made the right decision in moving to Indiana insofar as his 
personal happiness and contentment are concerned. Individuals often quit work to satisfy 
personal needs, such as to obtain higher pay. better working conditions or fringe benefits, to be 
near to (or farther from) other family members, to move to a nicer locale, etc. Such reasons for 
leaving work are often good personal reasons. However. unless the claimant has obtained 
definite assurance of other work to go to, such leaving for personal reasons is non-compelling 
and does not entitle the claimant to the benefits of the unemployment insurance program. 
Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah) 567 P. 2d 630 (1977). 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this matter is clear and convincing that claimant left work in Utah to seek 
religious fellowship in Indiana. The record is also clear that claimant had planned on moving to 
Indiana for some time because of religious conflicts with some members of his family 
However, claimant has made no showing that religious beliefs or problems on the job 
compelled him to quit work before he had obtained new work to which he could go upon 
leaving Utah. Given the set of facts which exist in this case, there is no alternative but to apply 
the disqualifying provisions of Section S(a) of the Act. The decision of the Board of Review 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this _____ day of June, 1981. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General of Utah 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
BY-------------
K. Allan Zabel 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Defendant's Brief to 
Doyle Max Wilson, Pro Se, 1912 Tennyson Drive, Clarksville, Indiana 47130, this ____ _ 
day of June, 1981. 
K. Allan Zabel 
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